As Arsène Wenger continues to create young teams, a new book examines whether Arsenal have benefited.
There is a fork in the road where Barnet Lane intersects with Totteridge Lane in north London. Habitually, the silver Mercedes bears left past the church heading for home a few hundred yards further on. Today, though, the driver takes the slip road on the right and a couple of minutes later pulls into a driveway.
Since he heard the sensational news that April afternoon, he has been turning over in his mind the possible implications. After an affectionate greeting between two old friends, Arsène Wenger comes straight to the point: 'Do you want me to resign?' he asks.
David Dein is still reeling from his, in his own words, 'brutal' dismissal earlier in the day - out of the blue he had been handed a letter terminating his directorship at the club he loved after 24 years.
'No,' Dein replies to Wenger's suggestion. 'I don't think that would be in the best interests of Arsenal.'
The implications of that dramatic day are still being felt around the club. Dein's role as Wenger's sidekick in acquiring players - 'We were a duo,' Dein says - has not been adequately filled. The Frenchman's approach to team-building and squad creation has become increasingly idiosyncratic. The group has steadily become less expensive, and less experienced.
The purchasing and retaining of key personnel has been a critical issue throughout Arsène Wenger's time at Arsenal. His squad-building technique has always differed from those of his main competitors in the Premier League.
In Wenger's first nine seasons, the haul of titles and FA Cups was accumulated for a deficit of £44m (£136m being the total spend). He was able to attain such value for money due to his knack of realising high return on players whose reputations had been enhanced by his tutelage.
Yet now, with the 'Invincibles' team of 2003-04 having been broken up, Wenger has not been spending to replace the depth of squad he once enjoyed. Instead, the reliance is largely on youth.
This runs contrary to comments made about the optimum age for footballers during the 2003-04 season. 'I'm convinced that up front now you need to be young,' he began. 'A goalkeeper is best between 30 and 35, central defence I would say best age 26 to 34. Midfield between 26 and 32 and a striker between 24 and 30. Those are the top ages.'
When challenged about the fact he appears to break the rules with some of his young players Wenger said: 'Exceptional talent breaks the rules - that means they play early - they make their own rules. I do not say that these players do not play before [these ages], but they are at the top of their potential during those age periods. But before, because they have an exceptional talent they play already.'
With the financial restrictions placed upon him because of the move to the Emirates, Wenger's shopping has to be even smarter, which means procuring less-established players. While it would be inaccurate to claim that Wenger used to sign current stars, it could certainly be argued Arsenal had more success when there was stiffer competition for places, with experienced campaigners often unable to get a start. Is it possible, in reaction to what Wenger has referred to as 'financial doping', that he has decided to build a team in a completely different way, declining to engage in any auction and reluctant to spend his budget by way of proving a point? Not if Dein is to be believed.
The then vice chairman became frustrated when Arsenal missed out on several targets due to lack of funds. In February 2004 it was put to Wenger that Dein had been sent on fool's errands in the past to look at Harry Kewell, Cristiano Ronaldo and José Antonio Reyes when the board knew they had limited funds, and had prioritised the building of a stadium over the team. Diplomatic as ever, Wenger replied: 'I believe that the club was at the moment of history where you have to go a step further if you want to become one of the biggest clubs in the world. I told them we had good youngsters and that we could still compete at the top level.' So you made a virtue out of necessity? 'Yes exactly, because I feel always that the team was still very young and that it could improve.'
In the summer of 2003 Ronaldo joined Manchester United and Kewell joined Liverpool, and, though Reyes subsequently arrived in January 2004, Dein described the situation as 'like being in a boxing ring with one hand tied behind my back'. He would emerge from board meetings 'with my eyeballs rolling' and was in no doubt that Wenger shared his frustration. Dein believes the manager needs 'bags more' cash and quickly. Despite Wenger's claims to the contrary ('I will always stick to the same policy, but if there is a guy who could one day reach out to another level and will cost a fortune, we could nevertheless buy him') his transfer and wages budget have been described by Ken Friar (a long-time servant of the club who is currently helping Wenger in transfer negotiations) as being a case of not so much the manager saying 'I need this much', but more asking: 'How much have I got?'
'What you always have to consider is how you produce a player,' Wenger says. 'If you want to completely develop a player, ideally you take him at the age of five and you bring him right through to the first team. But the reality is that he arrives at your club at 16 or 17. If you look at the top clubs in Europe, Arsenal are producing more young players than any of them. I have tried to build an academy that will recruit young local lads. At present, we have exceptional under-14s and under-16s. Technically they are extraordinary.'
Yet, despite a sterling reputation, Arsenal's academy has achieved very little in terms of producing first-team players. To believe that Wenger's young teams are created from a burgeoning youth policy is not the complete picture, certainly as far as true academy products are concerned.
The writing is generally on the wall for an Arsenal prospect if he is sent out on loan. The prospects Wenger has earmarked tend to be kept within the fold and given the odd chance from the bench or in the cups. Those who spend time away for a few months or a season are removed from Arsenal's huge wage bill, but, more pertinently, the playing time and exposure they receive can enhance their value in the transfer market.
A long established member of Wenger's scouting team, Tony Banfield, explains: 'At Arsenal, 15-year-olds are offered a three-year contract. Then at 18, if they are good enough, they are offered a further three years. In that time, if it is felt they might not be good enough, they are sent out on loan to get more first-team football, with the idea that it might improve them. When they return, if they are better they might stay, otherwise the club look to sell them.'
Often the loan is turned into a permanent move, with a sell-on clause built in allowing the club to continue to benefit from their initial commitment. David Bentley, who made the club several million when he moved from Blackburn to Tottenham this summer, is a good example.
Cited as evidence in favour of both the academy and the loan system, Ashley Cole's progress through the ranks must be regarded as atypical. With the club ceasing to field first-choice Brazilian left-back Silvinho for fear of punishment due to his being registered with a dubious Portuguese passport, Cole was pressed into service early in 2001. He had been on loan at Crystal Palace and, just before the Silvinho predicament arose, a fee of £200,000 had been agreed to make the move permanent.
So the sweeping under the carpet of Wenger's first-choice (quietly sold the following summer to Celta Vigo) opened the door to a genuine product of Arsenal's youth academy. The young man took his chance and was soon regarded as a permanent fixture. Academy head Liam Brady expressed pride that two of his former apprentices gained title medals in 2002; the other, goalkeeper Stuart Taylor, despite coach Bob Wilson's recommendation, was never given the opportunity to take over from David Seaman and only reached the required appearance mark due to a final-day substitute selection.
The Arsenal academy has been in existence for 10 years, but in that time still no one has followed in Cole's and Taylor's footsteps. The conclusion that can be drawn from the academy's life is that its function is to provide back-up players for the first-team squad, with the probability that they will eventually be sold on having failed to hold down a starting place. Brady - an Arsenal man through and through - must, at times, ask himself whether much of his time has been well spent, giving the lie to Dein's hyperbolic claim that Brady 'has the most important job at the club'.
The catchment area for targets has increased in size. Brazil was not an unfamiliar source for seasoned players (Silvinho, Edu and Gilberto were purchased over a period of four years), but now the scouting system is working hard to secure teenagers from all of South and Central America, such as Denilson and the Mexican Carlos Vela. There is unquestionably a greater Hispanic influence now and Dein says 'Arsène believes the future lies with South American and African players', although Wenger would not admit this publicly. It can be assumed that he holds this belief due to the perceived superior technique of Spanish and South American prospects and greater physicality of African players.
Wenger has built a team of scouts under the direction of Steve Rowley and Dave Holden who traverse the globe. Based in Italy, but with a territorial responsibility that extends beyond the Alps, Banfield explains: 'Scouts are headhunters looking for players who are better than those we have. At the end of each year our aim is to upgrade the playing performance of the team, physically, tactically and technically.' Gilles Grimandi, now scouting in France, succinctly states: 'We are able to attract the most promising prospects because we have a calling card stamped "Arsène Wenger". They know they will get the chance to play... it is one of our principal arguments.'
There is a harmonious common purpose throughout the disparate parts of the network. Wenger explains: 'The scouts and myself have regular discussions on how we assess players. We also arrange an annual get-together so the scouts can see how the first team train. We then make sure that they go and see any prospect we are interested in at training so there can be direct comparison. Great importance is attached to what can be learned by observing potential prospects' preparation.' As he joked regarding Reyes: 'We even watched him in training. How did I do that? With a hat and a moustache. We scouted him for two years, every minute of every game.'
Unlike many clubs which, according to Grimandi, 'have a tendency to pursue many leads in case they miss someone good... we limit our horizon and closely follow only a few. We will start at 16 or 17 and then, if necessary, follow them until they are 20... and perhaps one day they will sign.' This attention to detail is confirmed by Banfield's admission that 'only three youngsters have been signed by the club as a result of my own scouting over 11 years, but the potential returns when you get it right justify the work I do.' As an example, Grimandi was so painstaking that by the time Bacary Sagna arrived from Auxerre last summer, he was an atypical signing, at the end of the accepted age scale. 'It is difficult to envisage taking a player of 23,' Grimandi says. 'It's too late. It's not worth the trouble of extending our quotas [of older players].'
These quotas, together with the club policy that normally sees over 30s offered only one-year contracts, have had the effect of dramatically reducing the age of the squad since Wenger's most successful spell at the club, between 2001-02 and 2004-05, when the club landed five major trophies. Wenger has long had a reputation as a discoverer of exceptional young stars, largely due to the signings of Patrick Vieira and Nicolas Anelka, yet, not until Cesc Fábregas broke through in the autumn of 2004 had any comparable youthful talent emerged.
The way the team performed in the first half of last season appeared a total vindication of Wenger's methods, yet he choose not to spend in the January transfer window, despite a cash balance of £69m at the end of November 2007, of which £25m was available to the manager for spending on new players and their wages
With every passing transfer window since Wenger splashed out on Theo Walcott, Emmanuel Adebayor and Abou Diaby in January 2006, Arsenal supporters have become increasingly frustrated at the small amount of chequebook activity. Not least because with the club on more solid financial ground the only restraint on the manager is his own reluctance to spend.
It is revealing that despite not paying huge sums to bring in players, Arsenal's 2006-07 wage bill was similar in size to that of Manchester United. Wenger has made encouraging noises that he is prepared to deploy more of his budget and pay the price to add quality in key positions, but the evidence is not yet forthcoming. However, he has also stated: 'My priority will always be to keep the players I already have because above all I believe in the virtues of teamwork. And one can only maintain and develop players by communicating a culture, a culture which passes from generation to generation.'
His sense of timing about when to release a star, while not always popular with fans sad to see their heroes go, is usually spot-on. Wenger is ruthless when the welfare of the group is at stake. When he began to break up the 'Invincibles', he anticipated a drop in their contribution. Notably, since leaving, Patrick Vieira and Thierry Henry have missed a considerable amount of playing time due to injury.
It seems clear Wenger's approach is almost certainly a result of (financial) necessity being the mother of (youthful) invention, but how many other managers could have produced a team on such meagre resources that sells out a 60,000 stadium on a habitual basis?
To him, the absence of the Champions League trophy is the one gaping hole in his CV that he is determined to fill in before his work at Arsenal is complete. 'I want to win the Champions League, but it's step by step. And to win not once but two or three times, to go into the history of European football.' And if he can do it with his 'third' Arsenal side, it will be the supreme achievement, against all the odds.
There is a fork in the road where Barnet Lane intersects with Totteridge Lane in north London. Habitually, the silver Mercedes bears left past the church heading for home a few hundred yards further on. Today, though, the driver takes the slip road on the right and a couple of minutes later pulls into a driveway.
Since he heard the sensational news that April afternoon, he has been turning over in his mind the possible implications. After an affectionate greeting between two old friends, Arsène Wenger comes straight to the point: 'Do you want me to resign?' he asks.
David Dein is still reeling from his, in his own words, 'brutal' dismissal earlier in the day - out of the blue he had been handed a letter terminating his directorship at the club he loved after 24 years.
'No,' Dein replies to Wenger's suggestion. 'I don't think that would be in the best interests of Arsenal.'
The implications of that dramatic day are still being felt around the club. Dein's role as Wenger's sidekick in acquiring players - 'We were a duo,' Dein says - has not been adequately filled. The Frenchman's approach to team-building and squad creation has become increasingly idiosyncratic. The group has steadily become less expensive, and less experienced.
The purchasing and retaining of key personnel has been a critical issue throughout Arsène Wenger's time at Arsenal. His squad-building technique has always differed from those of his main competitors in the Premier League.
In Wenger's first nine seasons, the haul of titles and FA Cups was accumulated for a deficit of £44m (£136m being the total spend). He was able to attain such value for money due to his knack of realising high return on players whose reputations had been enhanced by his tutelage.
Yet now, with the 'Invincibles' team of 2003-04 having been broken up, Wenger has not been spending to replace the depth of squad he once enjoyed. Instead, the reliance is largely on youth.
This runs contrary to comments made about the optimum age for footballers during the 2003-04 season. 'I'm convinced that up front now you need to be young,' he began. 'A goalkeeper is best between 30 and 35, central defence I would say best age 26 to 34. Midfield between 26 and 32 and a striker between 24 and 30. Those are the top ages.'
When challenged about the fact he appears to break the rules with some of his young players Wenger said: 'Exceptional talent breaks the rules - that means they play early - they make their own rules. I do not say that these players do not play before [these ages], but they are at the top of their potential during those age periods. But before, because they have an exceptional talent they play already.'
With the financial restrictions placed upon him because of the move to the Emirates, Wenger's shopping has to be even smarter, which means procuring less-established players. While it would be inaccurate to claim that Wenger used to sign current stars, it could certainly be argued Arsenal had more success when there was stiffer competition for places, with experienced campaigners often unable to get a start. Is it possible, in reaction to what Wenger has referred to as 'financial doping', that he has decided to build a team in a completely different way, declining to engage in any auction and reluctant to spend his budget by way of proving a point? Not if Dein is to be believed.
The then vice chairman became frustrated when Arsenal missed out on several targets due to lack of funds. In February 2004 it was put to Wenger that Dein had been sent on fool's errands in the past to look at Harry Kewell, Cristiano Ronaldo and José Antonio Reyes when the board knew they had limited funds, and had prioritised the building of a stadium over the team. Diplomatic as ever, Wenger replied: 'I believe that the club was at the moment of history where you have to go a step further if you want to become one of the biggest clubs in the world. I told them we had good youngsters and that we could still compete at the top level.' So you made a virtue out of necessity? 'Yes exactly, because I feel always that the team was still very young and that it could improve.'
In the summer of 2003 Ronaldo joined Manchester United and Kewell joined Liverpool, and, though Reyes subsequently arrived in January 2004, Dein described the situation as 'like being in a boxing ring with one hand tied behind my back'. He would emerge from board meetings 'with my eyeballs rolling' and was in no doubt that Wenger shared his frustration. Dein believes the manager needs 'bags more' cash and quickly. Despite Wenger's claims to the contrary ('I will always stick to the same policy, but if there is a guy who could one day reach out to another level and will cost a fortune, we could nevertheless buy him') his transfer and wages budget have been described by Ken Friar (a long-time servant of the club who is currently helping Wenger in transfer negotiations) as being a case of not so much the manager saying 'I need this much', but more asking: 'How much have I got?'
'What you always have to consider is how you produce a player,' Wenger says. 'If you want to completely develop a player, ideally you take him at the age of five and you bring him right through to the first team. But the reality is that he arrives at your club at 16 or 17. If you look at the top clubs in Europe, Arsenal are producing more young players than any of them. I have tried to build an academy that will recruit young local lads. At present, we have exceptional under-14s and under-16s. Technically they are extraordinary.'
Yet, despite a sterling reputation, Arsenal's academy has achieved very little in terms of producing first-team players. To believe that Wenger's young teams are created from a burgeoning youth policy is not the complete picture, certainly as far as true academy products are concerned.
The writing is generally on the wall for an Arsenal prospect if he is sent out on loan. The prospects Wenger has earmarked tend to be kept within the fold and given the odd chance from the bench or in the cups. Those who spend time away for a few months or a season are removed from Arsenal's huge wage bill, but, more pertinently, the playing time and exposure they receive can enhance their value in the transfer market.
A long established member of Wenger's scouting team, Tony Banfield, explains: 'At Arsenal, 15-year-olds are offered a three-year contract. Then at 18, if they are good enough, they are offered a further three years. In that time, if it is felt they might not be good enough, they are sent out on loan to get more first-team football, with the idea that it might improve them. When they return, if they are better they might stay, otherwise the club look to sell them.'
Often the loan is turned into a permanent move, with a sell-on clause built in allowing the club to continue to benefit from their initial commitment. David Bentley, who made the club several million when he moved from Blackburn to Tottenham this summer, is a good example.
Cited as evidence in favour of both the academy and the loan system, Ashley Cole's progress through the ranks must be regarded as atypical. With the club ceasing to field first-choice Brazilian left-back Silvinho for fear of punishment due to his being registered with a dubious Portuguese passport, Cole was pressed into service early in 2001. He had been on loan at Crystal Palace and, just before the Silvinho predicament arose, a fee of £200,000 had been agreed to make the move permanent.
So the sweeping under the carpet of Wenger's first-choice (quietly sold the following summer to Celta Vigo) opened the door to a genuine product of Arsenal's youth academy. The young man took his chance and was soon regarded as a permanent fixture. Academy head Liam Brady expressed pride that two of his former apprentices gained title medals in 2002; the other, goalkeeper Stuart Taylor, despite coach Bob Wilson's recommendation, was never given the opportunity to take over from David Seaman and only reached the required appearance mark due to a final-day substitute selection.
The Arsenal academy has been in existence for 10 years, but in that time still no one has followed in Cole's and Taylor's footsteps. The conclusion that can be drawn from the academy's life is that its function is to provide back-up players for the first-team squad, with the probability that they will eventually be sold on having failed to hold down a starting place. Brady - an Arsenal man through and through - must, at times, ask himself whether much of his time has been well spent, giving the lie to Dein's hyperbolic claim that Brady 'has the most important job at the club'.
The catchment area for targets has increased in size. Brazil was not an unfamiliar source for seasoned players (Silvinho, Edu and Gilberto were purchased over a period of four years), but now the scouting system is working hard to secure teenagers from all of South and Central America, such as Denilson and the Mexican Carlos Vela. There is unquestionably a greater Hispanic influence now and Dein says 'Arsène believes the future lies with South American and African players', although Wenger would not admit this publicly. It can be assumed that he holds this belief due to the perceived superior technique of Spanish and South American prospects and greater physicality of African players.
Wenger has built a team of scouts under the direction of Steve Rowley and Dave Holden who traverse the globe. Based in Italy, but with a territorial responsibility that extends beyond the Alps, Banfield explains: 'Scouts are headhunters looking for players who are better than those we have. At the end of each year our aim is to upgrade the playing performance of the team, physically, tactically and technically.' Gilles Grimandi, now scouting in France, succinctly states: 'We are able to attract the most promising prospects because we have a calling card stamped "Arsène Wenger". They know they will get the chance to play... it is one of our principal arguments.'
There is a harmonious common purpose throughout the disparate parts of the network. Wenger explains: 'The scouts and myself have regular discussions on how we assess players. We also arrange an annual get-together so the scouts can see how the first team train. We then make sure that they go and see any prospect we are interested in at training so there can be direct comparison. Great importance is attached to what can be learned by observing potential prospects' preparation.' As he joked regarding Reyes: 'We even watched him in training. How did I do that? With a hat and a moustache. We scouted him for two years, every minute of every game.'
Unlike many clubs which, according to Grimandi, 'have a tendency to pursue many leads in case they miss someone good... we limit our horizon and closely follow only a few. We will start at 16 or 17 and then, if necessary, follow them until they are 20... and perhaps one day they will sign.' This attention to detail is confirmed by Banfield's admission that 'only three youngsters have been signed by the club as a result of my own scouting over 11 years, but the potential returns when you get it right justify the work I do.' As an example, Grimandi was so painstaking that by the time Bacary Sagna arrived from Auxerre last summer, he was an atypical signing, at the end of the accepted age scale. 'It is difficult to envisage taking a player of 23,' Grimandi says. 'It's too late. It's not worth the trouble of extending our quotas [of older players].'
These quotas, together with the club policy that normally sees over 30s offered only one-year contracts, have had the effect of dramatically reducing the age of the squad since Wenger's most successful spell at the club, between 2001-02 and 2004-05, when the club landed five major trophies. Wenger has long had a reputation as a discoverer of exceptional young stars, largely due to the signings of Patrick Vieira and Nicolas Anelka, yet, not until Cesc Fábregas broke through in the autumn of 2004 had any comparable youthful talent emerged.
The way the team performed in the first half of last season appeared a total vindication of Wenger's methods, yet he choose not to spend in the January transfer window, despite a cash balance of £69m at the end of November 2007, of which £25m was available to the manager for spending on new players and their wages
With every passing transfer window since Wenger splashed out on Theo Walcott, Emmanuel Adebayor and Abou Diaby in January 2006, Arsenal supporters have become increasingly frustrated at the small amount of chequebook activity. Not least because with the club on more solid financial ground the only restraint on the manager is his own reluctance to spend.
It is revealing that despite not paying huge sums to bring in players, Arsenal's 2006-07 wage bill was similar in size to that of Manchester United. Wenger has made encouraging noises that he is prepared to deploy more of his budget and pay the price to add quality in key positions, but the evidence is not yet forthcoming. However, he has also stated: 'My priority will always be to keep the players I already have because above all I believe in the virtues of teamwork. And one can only maintain and develop players by communicating a culture, a culture which passes from generation to generation.'
His sense of timing about when to release a star, while not always popular with fans sad to see their heroes go, is usually spot-on. Wenger is ruthless when the welfare of the group is at stake. When he began to break up the 'Invincibles', he anticipated a drop in their contribution. Notably, since leaving, Patrick Vieira and Thierry Henry have missed a considerable amount of playing time due to injury.
It seems clear Wenger's approach is almost certainly a result of (financial) necessity being the mother of (youthful) invention, but how many other managers could have produced a team on such meagre resources that sells out a 60,000 stadium on a habitual basis?
To him, the absence of the Champions League trophy is the one gaping hole in his CV that he is determined to fill in before his work at Arsenal is complete. 'I want to win the Champions League, but it's step by step. And to win not once but two or three times, to go into the history of European football.' And if he can do it with his 'third' Arsenal side, it will be the supreme achievement, against all the odds.
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